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Abstract
Drawing on Arab Barometer data, this article provides the backdrop for understanding continuity
and change since the Arab Spring in national-level public opinion attitudes toward economic and
political foreign policy issues in North Africa, inclusive of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and
Tunisia. The article leverages the concepts of differentiation and diffusion to understand how
international affairs shape public opinion in North Africa since the Arab Spring. Three findings
emerge. First, public opinion about domestic and international issues are linked in the minds of
North African citizens and foreign policy issues are more important factors underlying pre- and
post-Arab Spring politics than are often recognized. Especially in the post-Arab Spring era, Arab
citizens widely see external interference as a problem and this perception increased in every
North African country between 2013 and 2016. Moreover, there is considerable variation across
and within North African states in attitudes toward economic and political foreign policy issues,
including the Arab-Israeli conflict and attitudes about economic and security relationships with
Israel. Anti-Israeli sentiment increased substantially in the years leading up to and following the
Arab Spring. Finally, since the Arab Spring, anti-Americanism, as measured by negative
perceptions of U.S. culture, has declined in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, but risen slightly in
Egypt, even as North Africans demonstrate increased support for a U.S. role in resolving the
Arab-Israeli conflict during this same time period. These trends suggest that anti-Americanism is
highly dependent on specific domestic and international developments and is highly complex in
the Arab world.
Keywords: public opinion, Arab Spring, foreign policy, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, antiAmericanism, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, North Africa
Current Word Count: 5,938 (does not include figures and tables)
Introduction
Authoritarian regimes in North Africa prior to the Arab Spring left citizens with limited power to
hold their governments accountable. This was especially true of foreign policy. Under
authoritarianism, foreign policy is traditionally the purview of the executive; other state and nonstate actors, including the citizenry, have limited ability to hold the executive accountable (Fish
2006). Yet, the efforts of Arab governments to shape communication about foreign policy issues
and the attempts of citizens to influence outside powers via protest and boycott movements
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illustrate the degree to which Arab citizens are concerned about external issues affecting their
region (Benstead and Reif 2017; Farah and Newman 2010). Citizens throughout North Africa
hold diverse views regarding foreign policy issues that affect their country (e.g., Benstead and
Boduszynski 2015). At times, the views of citizens run counter to longstanding government
policies. But, in ways that are under-recognised, North African views have evolved during the
last decade as well, with support for recognizing Israel declining across the region and antiAmericanism diminishing on some measures as well. Exactly why views have shifted in some
countries and not others, and how these changes relate to the Arab Spring, is not well
understood.
Yet, to varying degrees across North African countries, the Arab Spring opened up new
avenues for citizens to contest foreign policy. Nowhere is this truer than in Tunisia, which
transitioned to an electoral democracy following the ousting of President Zine al-Abidine Ben
Ali in 2011; newfound freedoms opened up the potential for public mobilisation on foreign
policy issues, whether overt foreign policy issues like the Arab-Israeli conflict or indirect
political issues like the domestic political economy.1 Indeed, more than is reflected in the
international media, the Arab Spring mobilisations were, at least in part, related to the proWestern and pro-Israeli policies of authoritarian Arab regimes. The role that regional and
international issues played in shaping the Arab Spring, and how its aftermath will ultimately
reshape the region’s foreign policy, is a new and crucial research area for students of
international relations and comparative politics.
Drawing on Arab Barometer data, this article provides the backdrop for understanding
continuity and change since the Arab Spring in national-level public opinion attitudes toward
economic and political foreign policy issues. I focus on all five North African countries,
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inclusive of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia. To understand the linkages between
international and regional affairs and domestic public opinion, the article draws on the theoretical
concepts of differentiation (the degree to which there is greater variation in public opinion across
countries) and diffusion (the degree to which there is lesser variation in public opinion across
countries) before and after the Arab Spring (Gourevitch 1978; Bush 2017).2
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. After providing an overview of survey
research in North Africa that deals with citizen attitudes toward foreign policy, I briefly explore
three public opinion issues related to North African foreign policy: public perceptions of the
Arab Spring and external interference in North Africa, Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict, and
perceptions of the West and especially the United States. A final section offers general
conclusions.
Citizen attitudes toward foreign policy in North Africa
There is limited survey-based research on citizen attitudes toward foreign policy issues in North
Africa (for exceptions, see Tessler and Warriner 1997; Zoubir and Aït-Hamadouche 2006;
Tessler, Jamal and Robbins 2012; Tessler and Robbins 2007; Blaydes and Linzer 2012; Benstead
and Reif 2017). However, research using surveys of North African citizens is increasingly
possible due to the rapid expansion of survey research in the Arab world, especially since the
Arab Spring (see Table 1). Post-Arab Spring governments have allowed surveys to be conducted
in several North African countries, including Tunisia and Libya, which were previously closed to
survey researchers (Benstead 2017).3 As a result, there is a large body of publicly-available
surveys from North Africa, including 10 datasets from the World Values Survey, 14 from the
Arab Barometer, and 4 from Afro Barometer surveys.
[Table 1]
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The Arab Barometer focuses most directly on international and regional affairs and offers
the largest number of questions that are consistent from wave to wave and across countries on
these topics (Jamal and Tessler 2008; Tessler, Jamal, and Robbins 2012). In addition, survey
research conducted by the Transitional Governance Project (TGP 2017),4 the Program on
Governance and Local Development (GLD 2017),5 and other independent researchers has
increased, most of which also focus on topics relevant to regional and international affairs (Bush
and Jamal 2015; Bush and Prather 2017; Corstange and Marinov 2012). These data allow
researchers to compare attitudes pre- and post-Arab Spring throughout North Africa, considering
the fact that a total of six major surveys by these groups have been conducted in Libya, seven
surveys have been conducted in Algeria and Morocco, and eight surveys have been conducted in
Egypt and Tunisia. These data can help us better understand why international and regional
developments shape public opinion of economic and political issues within and across countries.
The Arab Barometer in particular includes an extensive number of questions over various
years that permit an examination of the competing views and conceptions of some of the most
salient foreign policy issues in North Africa. As of this writing, a total of four “waves” of
surveys have been carried out in North Africa, including in 2006 (Wave 1), 2011 (Wave 2),
2013-14 (Wave 3), and 2016 (Wave 4). By looking at data from 2006-2016, one can fully
appreciate how public opinion forms the backdrop for understanding continuity and change in
national-level foreign policy issues. In this regard, it is important to note that this article is not
meant to be an exhaustive survey of the foreign policy content of all national surveys conducted
in North Africa, nor is it even meant to be a systematic analysis of all foreign policy issues
treated in the Arab Barometer. It instead provides a brief overview of three foreign issues
captured in the Arab Barometer surveys, including public perceptions of the Arab Spring and
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external interference in Africa, public perceptions of relations with Israel and the Arab-Israeli
conflict, and public perceptions of the role of the West, especially the United States. These issues
provide the public opinion backdrop for understanding the evolving foreign policy roles played
by the state and non-state actors explored in the other contributions to this special issue.
Public perceptions of the Arab Spring and external interference in North Africa
According to the first wave of the Arab Barometer that was conducted in Algeria and Morocco
shortly before the Arab Spring (2006-2008), North African citizens identified a range of
domestic problems as the most important issues facing their countries (see Table 2). The most
important problem stated by respondents was their country’s “economic situation,” inclusive of
poverty, unemployment, and inflation, which was mentioned by 56 percent of respondents in
Morocco and 51 percent of respondents in Algeria. This was followed by “corruption,” which
was mentioned by 31 percent of respondents in Algeria and 27 percent of respondents in
Morocco. Only 8 percent of Algerians and 4 percent of Moroccans mentioned “authoritarianism”
as the most important problem confronting their country during the pre-Arab Spring.6 Very few
citizens in Algeria and Morocco identified foreign policy issues as the most important challenges
affecting their societies. As noted in Table 2, only 1 percent of Algerians and 1 percent of
Moroccans cited “ending U.S. occupation in Iraq” as the most important challenge. Similarly,
only 2 percent of Algerians and 2 percent of Moroccans cited the “Arab-Israeli conflict” as the
most important challenge. In short, the Arab Spring was largely driven by perceptions of
domestic as opposed to international issues.
[Table 2]
An emphasis on the overriding importance of the domestic dimension was reinforced by
surveys carried out in Tunisia and Egypt in the immediate aftermath of the Arab Spring, in which
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few Tunisian and Egyptian citizens believed external issues played a role in causing the Arab
Spring (see Table 3). When asked what they believed to be “the most important reason for the
protests” that eventually toppled the Tunisian and Egyptian dictatorships, 54 percent of
Egyptians and 63 percent of Tunisians cited “demands for improving the economic situation.”
The second most important reason was “combatting corruption,” which was cited by 29 percent
of Egyptians and 44 percent of Tunisians. In sharp contrast, less than 1 percent of Egyptians and
Tunisians cited external issues, whether their country’s “pro-Western policies” or “pro-Israeli
policies.”
[Table 3]
Rising and increasingly negative perceptions of foreign influence nonetheless increased
in several North African countries in the aftermath of the Arab Spring (see Figure 1). When
asked in 2013 whether “internal factors” or “external factors” were “more important in causing
the lack of development in the Arab world,” significant but nonetheless variable numbers of
North African citizens saw external factors as important, including 10 percent of Egyptians, 16
percent of Moroccans, 20 percent of Libyans and Tunisians, and 25 percent of Algerians. The
data also demonstrate an important pattern over time. Three countries witnessed an increase from
2013 to 2016 in the number of citizens citing external factors as important (from 25 to 32 percent
of Algerians, 20 to 35 percent of Tunisians, and 10 to 23 percent of Egyptians). Only in Morocco
did this percentage decline, from 16 percent in 2013 to 13 percent in 2016. An Arab Barometer
survey was not held in Libya in 2016.
[Figure 1]
Negative North African perceptions of foreign influence were particularly salient in
response to the question as to whether respondents agreed “to some or a great extent” that
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“foreign interference” was “an obstacle to reform in your country” in the post-Arab Spring (see
Figure 2). In 2016, those who agreed exceeded 70 percent in three North African countries:
Algeria (76 percent), Tunisia (72 percent), and Egypt (72 percent). In the case of Libya, which
was asked this question only in 2013 (a survey was not held in 2016), the percentage also
exceeded 70 percent (77 percent were in agreement). Only in Morocco was this figure at a lower,
but nonetheless relatively high level (49 percent in agreement). These results indicate strong
North African public sentiment that their societies are less able to chart their own course against
the tide of foreign interference. At the same time, however, the specific type of foreign
interference (i.e., political or economic) or from where it emanates (i.e., the U.S., Europe,
Russia, China, or the Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia) is not specified in this question.
[Figure 2]
In sum, although North African citizens, like those throughout the world, focus first and
foremost on their domestic environments as crucial to understanding their lot in life, including
why the Arab spring occurred and what has unfolded in its aftermath, concluding on this basis
that international issues are unimportant to North African citizens would be incorrect. Indeed,
North African citizens are sophisticated in their views, with many perceiving foreign interference
as a cause of the very economic and political problems at home that they say must be addressed.
Public perceptions of relations with Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict
North African nations vary widely in their relations with Israel. Historically, Morocco, Tunisia,
and Egypt have pursued relatively open relations with Israel, while Algeria and Libya have been
more staunchly anti-Israeli. Officially, Morocco does not recognize Israel, but has long
encouraged Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. The country has historically adhered to the Arab
League’s boycott of Israel, which began in 1945 (Benstead and Reif 2017), though Morocco

127

began strengthening its economic ties with Israel in 1994 following the Oslo Accords. Morocco
also strategically uses its support for the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process to argue that western
countries should accept its policy in the Sahara (Abadi 2007; Segev and Shumacher 2006).
However, more formal efforts to promote bilateral trade were cut in 2000 following the second
intifada, which began in 2000 (Fernández-Molina 2016).
Tunisia and Egypt have also had close foreign relations with Israel. Egypt established
diplomatic relations with Israel following the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, which made
Egypt a relative anomaly in the Middle East for its recognition of and diplomatic relations with
Israel (Tessler 2009; Shama 2014). While it has never had official diplomatic relations with
Israel, Tunisia became the first Arab country to host members of the Israeli leadership. Like
Morocco, it cut trade relations with Israel in 2000 due to the outbreak of the second intifada.
Unlike other countries in North Africa, however, Tunisia has had a more tangible relationship
with the Palestinians, having hosted the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) leadership in
Tunis from 1982 until the Oslo Accords were signed in 1993 (Abadi 2017).
Algeria and Libya have taken a more stringent approach toward Israel (Joffe and Paoletti
2011; St John 2003, 2011). Opposition to Israel on the part of both the Algerian government, as
well as its population, has always been strong. Algeria’s own troubled history with colonialism
informs much of the public’s opposition to Israeli policy. Algeria fought a brutal revolutionary
war against France from 1954 to 1962, and ever since has been a leader in the anti-colonial and
non-aligned movement (Mortimer 2015). Libya too did not had diplomatic relations with Israel.
Muammar Qaddafi frequently spoke out about Israeli colonialism and interference in Palestine
and Africa, which he saw as sapping Arab unity and strength (St John 2011). Yet, in the regime’s
final months, Saif al-Islam Qaddaffi unsuccessfully conducted back channel diplomacy with
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Israel, via a Jewish Austrian friend and political party member, David Lazar, and an Israeli
Druze member of the Knesset, Ayoob Kara, seeking to end NATO airstrikes against Libya in
exchange for assistance securing the release of Gilad Shalit from HAMAS (Asharq Al-Awsat
2011). On August 23, 2011, two months before the capture and death of Muammar Qaddafi,
Ahmed Shabani, a member of the Libyan opposition, expressed support for a two-state solution
in an attempt to build international support for the transitional regime in Libya (Melman 2011).
Later that year, Israel voted in the United Nations General Assembly to recognize the National
Transition Council as the representative of the Libyan people (United Nations 2011).
When it comes to the Arab-Israeli conflict, North Africans overwhelmingly express
solidarity with the Palestinians. Attitudes about the Arab-Israeli peace process and economic and
security relationships with Israel have nonetheless shifted over time (see Figure 3). In general,
Algerians hold the least conciliatory view toward Israel, while Egyptians hold the most
conciliatory view. In 2011, for example, when North Africans were asked whether the “Arab
world should accept the existence of Israel as a Jewish state in the Middle East,” 35 percent of
Egyptians (the most conciliatory) and 5 percent of Algerians (the least conciliatory) stated that
they would accept Israel, but only if a two-state solution was reached. The views of Tunisians
(18 percent) and Moroccans (24 percent) were between these extremes (and Libyans were not
surveyed in 2011).
[Figure 3]
Support for recognising Israel, even if a two-state solution with the Palestinians is
reached, has declined throughout North Africa over the last decade, except in the case of Algeria,
which witnessed a slight increase from 5 percent in 2011 to 11 percent in 2013. This diffusion
effect can likely be attributed to deteriorating relations between the Israelis and the Palestinians
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since the first intifada, including the breakdown of the Oslo Peace Process and the policies of
separation that gave rise to the increasing cycle of violence between the two communities
(Gordon 2008). In some cases (i.e., Morocco), this decline spans the pre- to post-Arab Spring
period, while in others (i.e., Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt), data are only available in the post-Arab
Spring period. The decline is quite substantial in some countries. In Egypt, which had the most
conciliatory position toward Israel, support for Israel even if a two-state solution is reached
dropped from 35 percent in 2011 to 19 percent in 2013. After Egypt, the country with the highest
support for recognising Israel was Morocco in 2006, when it stood at 32 percent. However, by
2011, Moroccan support fell to 24 percent. In Tunisia, support fell from 18 percent in 2011 to 13
percent in 2013. The survey was conducted one time in Libya in 2011, when only 11 percent
agreed with recognising Israel. These trends, at least in the cases of Egypt, Morocco, and
Tunisia, are perhaps partially attributable to the rise to positions of power of Islamist parties in
each of these countries (see Quinn Mecham’s contribution in this special issue).
[Figure 3]
The fourth wave of the Arab Barometer, conducted in 2016, obtained higher support for
recognising Israel, but the question was worded differently from that used in earlier years: “Do
you support or oppose the solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict based on the establishment of a
Palestinian State alongside Israel known as the two-state solution?” (see Figure 4). The
percentage of respondents “supporting” this solution included 25 percent of Algerians, 38
percent of Moroccans, 46 percent of Egyptians, and 64 percent of Tunisians (the 4th wave of the
Arab Barometer was not carried out in Libya). Although the difference between the 2016 survey
responses and those of previous years is potentially due to different wording, one must also
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consider the possibility that public opinion has shifted more in favor of Israel in the post-Arab
Spring era.
[Figure 4]
At least (and only) in the case of Egypt, another means of determining North African
support for relations with Israel during the Arab spring involved asking in 2011 and 2013
whether Egyptians supported “maintaining” their country’s peace treaty with Israel (see Figure
5). In 2011, 44 percent “strongly” supported maintaining the treaty, while 30 percent supported
maintaining, 7 percent did not support, and 15 percent strongly did not support. By 2013, only 25
percent of Egyptians strongly supported maintaining the treaty, while 45 percent supported
maintaining, 8 percent did not support, and 10 percent strongly did not support. Although these
results, if we combine “strongly supported” and “supported,” show some decline in support for
maintaining the status quo with Israel (from a total of 74 percent in 2011 to 70 percent in 2013),
overall a strong majority of Egyptians still favoured maintaining the treaty two years after the
Arab Spring uprisings. This was the case even following the ousting of Hosni Mubarak in 2011
and new elections that resulted in an electoral majority for Islamist parties in both chambers of
parliament in 2011-2012, as well as the election in 2012 of Mohammed Morsi, the presidential
candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood.
[Figure 5]
A final means for understanding North African support for relations with Israel during
the Arab Spring involved asking in 2013 questions about economic and security relations with
Israel. As for the economic dimension, 56 percent of Egyptians, 58 percent of Moroccans, and 82
percent of Tunisians indicated a preference for decreasing economic ties with Israel (see Figure
6). Algeria constituted the exception; only 20 percent of Algerians indicated a preference for
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decreased economic ties, whereas 1 percent favored increased ties and 71 percent favored
maintaining existing ties. A survey was not carried out in Libya. A similar dynamic emerged
regarding security ties: 51 percent of Egyptians, 54 percent of Moroccans, and 81 percent of
Tunisians indicated a preference for decreasing security ties with Israel (see Figure 7). Algeria
once again constituted the only exception; only 21 percent of Algerians indicated a preference
for decreased security ties, whereas 1 percent favored increased ties and 69 percent favored
maintaining existing ties. A survey was not carried out in Libya. Once again, these trends, at
least in the cases of Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, are perhaps partially attributable to the rise to
positions of power of Islamist parties in each of these countries (see Quinn Mecham’s
contribution in this special issue).
[Figure 6 and Figure 7]
Public perceptions of the role of the West, especially the United States
While there is some variation in North African foreign relations with the West, especially the
United States, all can generally be described as pragmatic – or what Mortimer (2015) refers to as
national interest pragmatism – particularly during the Arab Spring years. Much of this
pragmatism is shaped by joint security goals (Gause 2003/2004, 2015; Ryan 2009). Indeed,
North African states cooperate closely with the U.S. on security matters, and security
interdependence between the U.S. and many Arab states has increased in the post-cold war
period (Jamal 2012; see also the article by Schumacher and Schraeder in this special issue).
Egypt receives substantial U.S. military aid as a result of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty,
which was brokered by the U.S. during the Carter administration. Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia
are allies in the Global War on Terror (Fernández-Molina 2016; Benstead and Reif 2017), and
since 2013 Tunisia has enjoyed non-NATO ally status (Benstead 2016). Under Qaddafi, Libya
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and the U.S. had conflictual relations, which led to military skirmishes and U.S. sanctions being
imposed on Libya beginning in the 1980s (St. John 2011). The U.S. was the largest partner in
NATO to impose the no-fly zone that allowed rebels in 2011 to overthrow Qaddafi, leaving
Libyans with strongly pro-American and pro-western sentiments after 2012 (Benstead and
Boduszynski 2015).4
North Africans vary in their views of U.S. and Western culture, with positive views more
common than is recognised in the Western media. This is clearly demonstrated by Waves 1-4 of
the Arab Barometer which asked the question, “Do you agree or disagree with the following
statement: American and Western culture have positive aspects?” (see Figure 8). Before the Arab
Spring, there was much more diversity (and fluidity) in reported attitudes toward American
culture. Yet, with the exception of Egypt, the post-Arab Spring period saw a decline in antiAmericanism, as measured by positive orientations toward U.S. culture. In Morocco, for
example, agreement that U.S. culture has positive aspects rose from 60 percent in 2006 to 74
percent in 2016, while in Algeria, it increased from 52 percent in 2006 to 71 percent in 2016,
with an intervening drop to 37 percent in 2013. In Tunisia, positive impressions increased from
61 percent in 2011 to 77 percent in 2016, while in Egypt, it declined slightly from 53 percent to
48 percent between 2011 and 2016.
[Figure 8]
One way of more precisely understanding North African perceptions of the U.S. is to ask
about specific U.S. policies toward the Arab world. Specifically, Waves 3-4 of the Arab
Barometer asked the question, “What is the most positive policy that the U.S. can follow in our
region?” (see Table 4). It is striking that the preferred policy across all five North African
countries in 2013-14 was one of U.S. non-interference within the Arab world (i.e., “The U.S.
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shouldn’t interfere”). This ranged from as low of 26 percent of Moroccans to 79 percent of
Algerians. Moreover, these perceptions changed from 2013 to 2016. In Egypt and Morocco, for
example, greater numbers of respondents called for U.S. non-interference (31 percent of
Moroccans and 62 percent of Egyptians). In Algeria and Tunisia, however, decreasing numbers
of respondents called for U.S. non-interference, thereby suggesting a desire – at least in these
two countries – for a greater U.S. role within the region. Nevertheless, the opinion that the U.S.
should not intervene at all was by far the most popular answer among several important foreign
policy-related responses, including should the U.S. intervene to promote democracy, promote
economic development, promote women’s rights, or contain Iran.
One of the most interesting shifts, however, involved the specific policy response as to
whether the U.S. should attempt to “solve the Arab-Israeli conflict” (see Table 4). There was
increasing support throughout North Africa from 2013 to 2016 for the U.S. to take on a more
proactive role in this regard. The proportion supporting this policy increased from 7 to 23 percent
in Algeria. In Egypt, it remained constant at 15 percent, while in Morocco it increased from 20 to
27 percent. In Tunisia, the increase was from 7 to 19 percent. This suggests that while sentiments
among North Africans toward Israel have soured over the course of a decade, this has brought
with it an increased demand for Western countries to assist with a resolution to the conflict.
[Table 4]
Finally, it is also striking to note the degree to which North African publics are willing to
justify attacks against the United States (e.g., see Tessler and Robbins 2007). This is clearly
demonstrated by a question, which asked whether North African publics agreed or disagreed
with the following statement: “The United States’ interference in the region [Arab world]
justifies armed operations against the United States everywhere” (see Figure 9). Whereas support
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for militancy increased from 40 percent to 61 percent in Algeria between 2011 and 2013, it
nonetheless declined in Tunisia from 44 percent to 34 percent during those same years. In
Morocco and Libya, the question has been asked just once, but a larger proportion of Moroccans
(49 percent) than Libyans (37 percent) saw these actions as at least somewhat justified (Tessler
and Robbins 2007).
[Figure 9]
Conclusion
These analyses illustrate the linkages between international and regional affairs and domestic
public opinion and offer examples of public opinion differentiation (the degree to which there is
greater variation in public opinion across countries) and diffusion (the degree to which there is
lesser variation in public opinion across countries) before and after the Arab Spring (Gourevitch
1978; Bush 2017). Three findings emerge. First, public opinion about domestic and international
issues are linked in the minds of North African citizens, and foreign policy issues, broadly
construed, are more important factors underlying the pre- and post-Arab Spring than are often
recognized by analyses that emphasize domestic issues (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015).
Especially in the post-Arab Spring era, Arab citizens widely see external interference as a
problem, and this perception increased in every North African country between 2013 and 2016.
Second, there is considerable variation across and within North African states in attitudes toward
economic and political foreign policy issues, including the Arab-Israeli conflict and attitudes
about economic and security relationships with Israel. Anti-Israeli sentiment increased
substantially in the years leading up to and following the Arab Spring, which also coincided with
the second intifada. Finally, since the Arab Spring, anti-Americanism, as measured by negative
perceptions of U.S. culture, has declined in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, but risen slightly in
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Egypt, even as North Africans demonstrate increased support for a U.S. role in resolving the
Arab-Israeli conflict during this same time period. These trends suggest that anti-Americanism is
highly dependent on specific domestic and international developments, and in any case is highly
complex, especially in the Arab world (Lynch 2006; Benstead and Reif 2005, 2013; Zoubir and
Aït-Hamadouche 2006). In sum, analyzing the continuity and change in national- level attitudes
toward economic and political foreign policy issues in North Africa help inform our
understanding of both the nuance of public opinion across North Africa, as well as how public
opinion shaped the foundations and outcomes of the Arab Spring.
Notes
1

Libya too held a free and fair election in 2012, but the security vacuum and intensification of

civil war has undercut representative government.
2

In classic international relations theory, Waltz (1959, 1975) explained war through three

images of analysis: the individual, the state, and the international system (i.e., anarchy).
Gourevitch (1978) expanded on this work by arguing that domestic political structures and
outcomes are shaped by the international system, in contrast to the second image, which explores
the ways that international politics are shaped by characteristics of the state, such as capitalism.
(Bush 2017; see also Bamert, Gilardi, and Wasserfallen 2015; Lynch 2013; Solingen 2012; Bush
and Prather 2017; Benstead, Kao, and Lust 2017; Corstange and Marinov 2012; Marinov 2013;
Bush and Jamal 2015).
3

Due to authoritarianism, none of the major cross-national surveys were conducted before 2011

in Tunisia and Libya. In Egypt, the World Values Survey was conducted in 2001 and 2008, but
the Arab Barometer, with its direct relevance to the study of public attitudes toward foreign
policy, was not conducted in Egypt until after the Arab Spring.
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4

Ellen Lust, Lindsay Benstead, and collaborators launched the TGP (2017) to study the

transitional politics of Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt.
5

The Local Governance Performance Index was developed by Benstead, Landry, Lust, and

Malouche to explain variation in education, health, and municipal service quality and
transparency. The survey draws large samples of 300 more in each locality, allowing
comparisons to be made across municipalities (GLD 2017).
6

Data weighted for all analyses of Waves 2 and 3 of the Arab Barometer.
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Table 1
Nationally-representative surveys in North Africa (pre- and post-Arab Spring)
World
Values
Survey

Arab
Barometer

Pre2011
2001
2007

Post2011
2011

Pre2011
2006

Algeria

2002

2013

2006

Tunisia

-

2013

-

Libya

-

2014

-

Egypt

2001
2008

2013

-

Subtotal
Total

5

5

2

Morocco

10

Afro
Barometer

Transitional
Governance
Project

Program on
Governance
and Local
Development
PrePost2011
2011
-

Total
surveys/country

Post2011
20132014
2016
2011
2013
2016
2011
2013
2016
2014

Pre2011
-

Post2011
2013

Pre2011
-

Post2011
-

-

2013

-

-

-

-

7

-

2013

-

2012
2014

-

2015

8

-

2013

-

-

-

6

2011
2013
2016
12

-

-

-

2013
(3
surveys)
2011
2012

-

-

8

0

4

0

7

0

1

14

4

7

145

1

7

36

Table 2
Perception of most important problem facing the country (2006-08)
(percentage identifying issue as the most important)
Algeria

Internal issues
Economic situation
Corruption
Authoritarianism

Morocco

51%
31%
8%

External issues
Ending U.S. occupation in Iraq
Arab-Israeli conflict
Other
Don't know/refuse

56%
27%
4%

Algeria

Morocco

1%
2%

1%
2%
7%
4%

8%

Source: Arab Barometer, Wave 1. Question not asked in Waves 2-4.
Question wording: “In your opinion which of the following is the most important problem facing
[respondent’s country] today? Economic situation (poverty, unemployment, inflation);
Corruption; Authoritarianism; Ending the U.S. occupation of Iraq; The Arab-Israeli conflict.”
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Table 3
Perceived causes of the Arab Spring (2011)
(percentage identifying a cause)
Egypt Tunisia
Internal issues
Economic situation
Civil freedoms
Prevent Gamal Mubarak from taking power
Corruption
Replace Mubarak/Ben Ali
Social justice
Price hikes
External issues
Pro-Western policy
Pro-Israeli policy
Don't know/refuse

54%
7%
7%
29%
10%
0%
0%

63%
14%

1%
0%
1%

0%
0%
2%

17%
4%
0%
0%

Source: Arab Barometer, Wave 2. Question not asked in Wave 3.
Question wording: “A number of citizens participated in the protests between 25 January and 11
February 2011 for various reasons. In your opinion, what was the most important and the second
most important reason for the protests? Demands for improving the economic situation;
Demands for civil and political freedoms and liberation from repression; Demands for authority
not to be passed down to Gamal Mubarak; Combating corruption; Replacing the Mubarak
regime with an Islamic regime; Objecting to pro-Western Egyptian policy; Objecting to proIsrael Egyptian policy.” Tunisia: “A number of citizens participated in the protests between 17
December 2010 and 14 January 2011 for various reasons. In your opinion, what was the most
important and the second most important reason for the protests? Demands for improving the
economic situation; Demands for civil and political freedoms and liberation from repression;
Combating corruption; Replacing Ben Ali’s regime with an Islamic regime; Objecting to proWestern Tunisian policy; Other.”
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Figure 1
Perception of external vs. internal sources for the lack of development (2007-16)
(percentage indicating external vs. internal sources)

Source: Arab Barometer, Wave 4.

Question wording: “Some people attribute the lack of development in the Arab world compared
to other parts of the world to external factors, while others blame internal factors. In your
opinion, which is more important in causing the lack of development in the Arab world? 1.
Internal factors. 2. External factors. 3. Both are equally important (Do not read).”
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Figure 2
Perception of foreign interference as an obstacle to reform in North Africa (2011-16)
(percentage agreeing to some or a great extent)

Source: Arab Barometer, Waves 2-4. Question not asked in Wave 1.
Question wording: “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:
Foreign interference is an obstacle to reform in your country. I agree to a great extent; I agree to
some extent; I disagree; I absolutely disagree.”
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Figure 3
Public opinion attitudes about recognising Israel (Waves 1-3)
(percentage)

Source: Arab Barometer, Wave 1-3.
Question wording: “Which of the following statements best expresses your opinion about the
problem of Israel and Palestine? The Arab world should accept the existence of Israel as a Jewish
state in the Middle East only when the…; The Arab world should not accept the existence of
Israel as a Jewish state in the Middle East.” This question was not asked in the 4th Wave.
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Figure 4
Public opinion attitudes about recognising Israel (Wave 4)
(percentage)

Source: Arab Barometer, Wave 4.
Question wording: “Do you support or oppose the solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict based on
the establishment of a Palestinian State alongside Israel known as the two-state solution? 1.
Support. 2. Oppose.”
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Figure 5
Egyptian public opinion attitudes about existing peace treaty with Israel
(percentage)
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Source: Arab Barometer, Wave 3. Question not asked in Wave 4.
Question wording: “Do you: Strongly support maintaining the peace treaty with Israel; Support
maintaining the peace treaty with Israel; Support abolishing the peace treaty with Israel; Strongly
support abolishing the peace treaty with Israel.”
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Figure 6
Public opinion attitudes about economic relations with Israel
(percentage)
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Source: Arab Barometer, Wave 3.
Question wording: “Do you prefer that future economic relations between your country and
Israel. Become stronger than they were in previous years; Remain the same as they were in
previous years; Become weaker than they were in previous years.”
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Figure 7
Public opinion attitudes about security relations with Israel
(percentage)
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Source: Arab Barometer, Wave 3.
Question wording: “Do you prefer that future security relations between your country and Israel.
Become stronger than they were in previous years; Remain the same as they were in previous
years; Become weaker than they were in previous years.”
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Figure 8
Public opinion attitudes about American and Western culture
(percentage)

Source: Arab Barometer, Waves 1-2 and 4. Question not asked in Wave 3.
Question wording: “Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: American and
Western culture have positive aspects. I strongly agree; I disagree.” (Wave 1-2). “Do you agree
or disagree with the following statement: American and Western culture have positive aspects?
1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Disagree 4. Strongly disagree.” (Wave 4).
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Table 4
Public opinion attitudes regarding desired U.S. policy approach to the Arab world
(percentage)

Promote
democracy
Promote
economic
development
Contain Iran
Solve the ArabIsraeli conflict
Promote women’s
rights
T he U.S. should
not interfere
Don't know/refuse

Algeria
(2013)

Algeria
(2016)

Egypt
(2013)

Egypt
(2016)

Libya
(2014)

Morocco
(2014)

Morocco
(2016)

T unisia
(2013)

T unisia
(2016)

1%

9%

10%

4%

11%

13%

7%

8%

4%

3%

11%

7%

7%

12%

25%

18%

26%

19%

2%

3%

1%

1%

0%

7%

23%

15%

15%

11%

20%

27%

7%

19%

1%

8%

1%

2%

1%

5%

4%

1%

3%

79%

44%

44%

62%

54%

26%

31%

54%

50%

8%

5%

25%

10%

9%

8%

13%

4%

5%

Source: Arab Barometer, Waves 3-4. Question not asked in Waves 1-2.
Question wording: “What is the most positive policy that the U.S. can follow in our region?
Promote democracy; Promote economic development; Contain Iran; Solve the Arab-Israeli
Conflict; Promote women’s rights; The U.S. shouldn’t interfere.”
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Figure 9
Public opinion regarding support for armed operations against the U.S.
(percentage)

Source: Arab Barometer, Waves 2-3. Question not asked in Waves 1 or 4.
Question wording: “Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The United States’
interference in the region justifies armed operations against the United States everywhere. I
strongly agree; I agree; I disagree; I strongly disagree.”
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